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ABSTRACT  
 
This paper analyzes the goals, the organizational structures and processes, and 
the investment criteria that underlie venture strategies in Germany today, using a 
sample of 20 corporate venture capital organizations (CVCs).  The performance of 
these CVCs is examined and the data are compared with those generated by 
studies on German independent venture capital organizations (VCs) as well as 
with European and U.S. CVCs.  The study concludes that German CVCs focusing 
either on financial or on strategic objectives are more successful than those with a 
mixed approach. Further, CVCs with a strong financial focus seem to be finan-
cially – and sometimes also strategically – more successful than CVCs with a 
strong strategic focus.  Finally, based on these findings, theses concerning the 
CVC’s organizational learning are developed. 
 
 
 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG  
 
Anhand von 20 Corporate Venture Capital Gesellschaften (CVCs) in Deutschland 
analysieren die Autorinnen im vorliegenden Papier deren Ziele, Organisations-
strukturen und -prozesse sowie deren Investitionskriterien. Es wird zum einen der 
finanzielle und strategische Erfolg dieser CVCs untersucht, zum anderen werden 
die Ergebnisse mit Daten deutscher klassischer VCs sowie europäischer und U.S. 
CVCs verglichen. Die Kernaussage der Studie ist, dass deutsche CVCs, die sich 
entweder auf strategische oder auf finanzielle Ziele konzentrieren, erfolgreicher 
sind als solche, die beide Ziele gleichermaßen verfolgen. Desweiteren wird 
deutlich, dass die CVCs mit einem überwiegend finanziellen Ansatz finanziell – 
und zuweilen auch strategisch – erfolgreicher zu sein scheinen als CVCs mit 
einem überwiegend strategischen Investitionsfokus.  Abschließend werden – auf 
diesen Ergebnissen basierend – Thesen zum organisationalen Lernverhalten der 
CVCs entwickelt. 
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Corporate Venture Capital Organizations in Germany 
A Comparison  
There is little recent empirical research on corporate venture capital organizations 
(CVCs) and most of the relevant literature focuses on the Anglo-American market.  
One reason for the dearth of empirical data on the German CVC market (Opitz 
1990; Rauser 2002; Schween 1996; Witt and Brachtendorf 2002; Mackewicz & 
Partner 2003) is that CVCs are comparatively rare and young in Germany.  
Consequently, studies on German CVCs are based on an extremely small 
number of cases.  The studies that do exist tend to portray the German market as 
less successful than more mature markets, such as those in the United States 
(Schween 1996).  Another body of literature compares CVCs with independent 
venture capital organizations (VCs) (Gompers and Lerner 1998; Maula, Autio and 
Murray 2003 forthcoming; Siegel, Siegel and MacMillan 1988; Weber and Dierkes 
2002). The differences between CVCs and classical VCs raise interesting re-
search questions, especially when one investigates their strategic and financial 
success. 
 
This study inquires into four aspects: 
1. A comparison of newly gathered data on goals, decision-making pro-
cesses, fund structure, and attainment of strategic and financial goals of 20 
German CVCs with 52 German independent VCs as well as with other 
German, European and U.S. CVCs (to the extent comparable data are 
available). 
2. An analysis of fundamental goals and their effect on the strategic and 
financial success of CVCs. The intention is to find out whether a prioriti-
zation of financial goals, a mixed approach pursuing both financial and 
strategic goals, or a distinctly strategic focus is the most promising 
approach for CVC programs.  
3. An examination of organizational structures and processes and their effect 
on the strategic and financial success of CVCs.  The intention is to identify 
the most promising structures and processes for CVCs in terms of their 
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level of dependence or independence.  An investigation of the consistency 
between organizational structures & processes and their underlying funda-
mental goals. The intention is to identify such constellations of organi-
zational goals and structures/processes, which positively influence a CVC’s 
success and hence, should be aimed for. 
The patterns that emerge from the new insights from our own data in conjunction 
with data on German VCs as well as European and US CVCs contribute signi-
ficantly towards building a generally valid theory for CVC structures and 
strategies. The ultimate goal of this paper is to provide practical advice and clarity 
for a CVC as to which strategies to pursue and how to structure a CVC 
organization in order to increase the likelihood of success.  
Past Research on Corporate Venture Capital 
Interest in CVCs has fluctuated markedly in the past decades.  Gompers and 
Lerner (1998) identified three major waves, the most recent of which began in the 
late 1990s.  The abundance or lack of research on CVCs is a reflection of the 
economic importance of this sector over time.   
 
A flurry of new studies has appeared during the last three years (Birkinshaw, van 
Basten Batenburg and Murray (2002); Chesbrough 2002, 2000; Gompers and 
Lerner 1998; Kann 2000; Keil 2000; Maula and Murray 2001a, 2001b; Maula, 
Autio and Murray 2003; Poser 2002; Rauser 2002; Thornhill and Amit 2001; 
Weber and Dierkes 2002; Weber and Weber 2002).  The recent publications on 
which we focus permit a closer look at the performance of CVCs and the potential 
success factors, including the relationship between goals and organizational 
structures and processes. 
 
Gompers and Lerner (1998), who analyzed over thirty thousand transactions by 
corporate and other venture organizations in the American market, found that 
corporate venture investments in entrepreneurial firms appear to be at least as 
successful as those backed by independent venture capital organizations.  They 
suggest that, “the presence of a strong strategic focus is critical to the success of 
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CVCs. ... Corporate programs without a strong strategic focus appear to be much 
less stable, frequently ceasing operations after only a few investments, but 
strategically focused programs appear to be as stable as independent organi-
zations.”  (Gompers and Lerner 1998, p. 34).  The authors do not comment on the 
role of financial goals and success, making it difficult to compare their findings 
fully with the results of other research, including this study. 
 
Siegel, Siegel and MacMillan (1988) investigated the independence, in terms of 
decision-making autonomy and fund structure, and the performance of CVCs.  
They distinguished between “pilots” and “copilots” within the CVC sample.  Pilots 
are marked by substantial organizational independence and are keenly attuned to 
return on investment (ROI) and entrepreneurialism in their investment criteria.  
Copilots are highly dependent on corporate management with respect to venture 
funding and decision-making autonomy.  They attach greater weight to strategic 
benefits for the corporation, which are more important than criteria relating to the 
entrepreneurial team and to financial performance, such as ROI.  The study 
showed that CVCs tending to act like classical VCs (pilots) achieve higher ROI 
than copilots do and are just as strategically successful for the parent company.  
The authors of the study therefore concluded that an excessively strong in-
sistence on the strategy criteria of the parent company could lead to serious 
problems with the pursuit of CVC activities (Siegel et al. 1988, p. 246). 
 
The findings of these two major studies suggest that CVCs are caught in a 
contradiction, or are at least walking a tightrope.  While one study recommends 
that CVCs take a strong strategic focus because it is critical to success (Gompers 
and Lerner (1998), the other study warns that an excessively strong strategic 
orientation harms both the strategic and economic success of the CVC program  
(Siegel et al.1988).  The two studies were undertaken within a ten years time 
difference, so the market might have changed substantially during this period.  
Furthermore, the studies took different approaches – the former interviewed 
managers in VCs, the latter analyzed data on portfolio companies.  Nevertheless, 
their results are sufficiently comparable and provide a good basis for further 
research.  Hence, the goal of this contribution is to elucidate these seemingly 
contradictory assessments by examining the German market, and thereby to 
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contribute to developing a generalizable theory on the structure and strategy of 
CVS.  
 
Chesbrough (2002) somewhat reconciles these two approaches by arguing for an 
investment strategy depending on the objective – strategic or financial – and the 
degree to which the operations of the investing company and the start-up are 
linked – closely or tightly. He differentiates between four investment approaches, 
which have to be aligned with the long-term business strategy of the corporation 
and its operational capabilities: (1) Driving Investments, which are characterized 
by a strategic rationale and tight links between start-up and the operations of the 
investing company, (2) Enabling Investments, which are primarily made for 
strategic reasons but do not couple the venture tightly with its own operations,   
(3) Emergent Investments, which are primarily financially driven, but might have a 
strategic potential for the parent company in the future, (4) Passive Investments, 
which provide financial return only (Chesbrough 2002, p. 6).  
 
Turning to the German literature, the three known studies on corporate venture 
capital and their success in Germany, apart from our own (Weber and Dierkes 
2002; Weber and Weber 2002), are by Schween (1996) and very recently by Witt 
and Brachtendorf (2002), and Mackewicz & Partner (2003).  A limitation that all 
empirical studies in this field have to grapple with is the small number of CVCs in 
Germany.  Schween (1996) investigated the goals, investment criteria, and 
organizational form of German CVCs in a small sample of only 12 cases.  His 
main findings were that 10 of the 12 companies (83%) stressed strategic goals, 
with two companies (17%) stating that they pursued strategic and financial goals 
simultaneously.  The dominance of the strategic goals was also reflected in the 
priority given to the investment criteria named.  Financial criteria ranked fourth 
after three strategic ones. The strategic and financial success of these CVC 
programs was modest.  Only two of the 12 CVCs (17%) that Schween studied 
were satisfied with their strategic goals, a figure corresponding to an arithmetic 
mean of 2.0.  The financial goals scored virtually the same result – an arithmetic 
mean of 1.9 (Schween 1996, p. 247). 
 
Witt and Brachtendorf (2002) tried to examine why so few companies have 
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succeeded so far in driving their growth agenda by a means of corporate 
venturing (Stringer 2000).  On the basis of 21 personal interviews, they showed 
that a high number of German CVCs do not follow the recommendations for 
organizational structures and processes that have been generated by the 
international research on successfully operating CVC programs.  Witt and 
Brachtendorf (2002) find that the CVCs in their sample are “much too dependent 
on the parent company” (p. 11), in terms of their fund structure as well as in terms 
of their decision making processes.  Another key finding of the study is that the 
top managers of the CVCs have too little entrepreneurial experience and their 
remuneration packages are inappropriate in light of the risks involved and the 
market conditions.  The authors conclude that there is a relatively low consistency 
between international recommendations and their implementation.  They do not 
make any statement about the necessity of consistency between the CVCs’ goals 
and structures and processes. 
 
Mackewicz & Partner (2003) studied 31 CVCs and found that 15% of them pursue 
strategic goals exclusively and 33% have primarily strategic goals, making for a 
total of 48% that have a strong strategic focus. They found that 30% emphasize 
financial goals (of which 3% report that they pursue financial goals exclusively; 
and 27% indicate “primarily”).  One fifth of the sample (21%) pursues both goals 
equally strongly.  They point out – in line with Siegel et al. (1988) – that the 
ambition to pursue different, often conflicting goals with one and the same CVC 
unit bears substantial potential for conflict, inefficiencies and ultimately, failure to 
reach either strategic or financial goals.  Mackewicz & Partner (2003) therefore 
recommend a focused strategy and structure for CVC organizations.  They 
differentiate between six groups according to the CVCs’ most important core 
goals (“Innovators”, “Salespeople”, “Observer”, “Renewer”, “Entrepreneurs”, and 
“Investors”).  These core goals differ especially with regard to (i) interaction with 
the corporate mother, (ii) maturity of the venture, (iii) investment horizon, and (iv) 
partnerships with external investors.  Mackewicz & Partner (2003) assign these 
typologies to what they consider are appropriate forms of organization (e.g. 
business unit, joint fund, external VC unit, fund of fund), depending on the 
necessary degree of dependence on the parent company and the core goals of 
the CVC program. They emphasize the importance of the consistency between 
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goals and organizational structures and processes: “the goals and organization 
form must be aligned“ (Mackewicz & Partner 2003, p. 39).  However, the authors 
do not specify which type of approach is likely to be the most successful.  They 
only state that the experts they interviewed believe that independence from the 
corporate parent is the most important factor for a CVCs success.  They therefore 
argue for legally independent CVC units, but they do not test this recommendation 
on the basis of their own dataset.  
 
Birkinshaw et al. (2002) undertook an extensive international CVC survey.1 They 
clustered the CVCs in four groups of venture units according to their overriding 
strategic investment objectives (p. 25): (1) The External Financials, who invest in 
external business opportunities primarily to deliver financial returns to the parent 
company, (2) The External Strategics, who invest in external business opportu-
nities for strategic reasons, (3) The Internal Growths, who invest in internal 
investment opportunities for growth, and for other internal reasons, and (4) The 
Internal Spin Outs, who invest in internal investment opportunities as a means of 
leveraging intellectual property and spinning out businesses that do not fit.  
Among their main findings were that venture units have to be both independent 
and attached, but for very “young” venture units, “independence is more important 
than integration” (Birkinshaw et al. 2002, p. 34).  Furthermore, they concluded 
that, “there is a clear (and significant) trend that equates greater independence in 
funding with superior performance” (Birkinshaw et al. 2002, p. 33).  The authors 
do not make a consistent link between goals and structures and processes, 
although they do point in this direction.  For example, they note that, “if the 
venture unit is attempting to develop strategic options for its parent company, it 
should – all else being equal – not create strong linkages to its business units“ 
(Birkinshaw et al. 2002, p. 33). 
 
The three different kinds of categorizations presented in the literature are brought 
together and related to the categorization used in this paper as a basis for 
                                            
1  Most of the CVCs surveyed are located in North America (including Canada) and 
Europe. 
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generating a theory on CVC structure and strategy (see Figure 1).  The horizontal 
axis in Figure 1 represents the overall corporate investment objectives (strategic 
vs. financial).  This axis is identical with the dimension of Chesbrough (2002) and 
corresponds in kind with the dimension of Mackewicz & Partner (2003) (“kind of 
goal”).  Birkinshaw et al. (2002) use a variety of dimensions to differentiate their 
four investment groups. One of their dimensions, “reason for establishing a 
venture unit” somewhat corresponds with our classification.   
 
Figure 1: Comparison of CVC investment categories 
I II
IVIII
Corporate main investment objectives / goals
primarily financial
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l s
tr
uc
tu
re
s
&
pr
oc
es
se
s
in
de
pe
nd
en
t
de
pe
nd
en
t
primarily strategic
C
lo
se
ne
ss
to
pa
re
nt
 c
om
pa
ny
(h
ig
h 
vs
.l
ow
))
Au
to
no
m
y 
le
ve
lo
fv
en
tu
re
 u
ni
ts
Seller, Innovator
Entrepreneur
Renewer, Observer
Investors
Passive Investment
Emergent Investment
Enabling Investment
Driving Investment
Internal Growth
Internal Spin-out
External Strategic
External Financial
Mackewicz (2003)
Birkinshaw (2002)
Chesbrough (2000)
Li
nk
 to
 o
pe
ra
tio
na
lc
ap
ab
ilit
y
(lo
os
e
vs
.t
ig
ht
)
 
The vertical axis represents the degree of (in-)dependence of the organizational 
structures and processes of the CVCs.  This axis corresponds with the “link to 
operational capability”-dimension (loosely vs. tightly) of Chesbrough (2002), with 
the “closeness to the parent company”-dimension (high vs. low) introduced by 
Mackewicz & Partner (2003) as well as with the “autonomy level of venture unit” of 
Birkinshaw et al. (2002). 
 
Birkinshaw et al.’s categorization into external and internal investment objectives 
is somewhat different.  Of their four groups only the External Financial’s seem to 
be comparable to our fourth as well as to Chesbrough’s (2002) fourth category 
(Passive Investments).  Birkinshaw et al.’s second, third and fourth group of 
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venture units mentioned above are all mainly strategically driven, and form 
therefore a kind of subgroup of mainly strategically oriented investments. Of the 
six Mackewicz typologies, the “Investors” correspond to our fourth category; the 
“Renewer”, “Entrepreneurs” and “Observer” can broadly be placed in our third 
category.  Chesbrough’s (2002) four groups come closest to our four categories.  
Propositions 
Drawing the findings from the literature together, the following propositions can be 
investigated on the basis of our additional German data set.  Doing so provides 
the opportunity to re-examine the somewhat contradictory findings in the existing 
literature in order to contribute to building a consistent theory. 
 
Based on the findings of both Gompers and Lerner (1998), that CVC programs 
with a strong strategic focus – unlike those without – appear to be stable and the 
findings of Siegel et al. (1988), that CVCs focusing on financial goals achieve 
higher ROIs and are just as strategically successful as strategically oriented ones, 
our proposition is that a clear investment focus – either mainly financial or mainly 
strategic – will be more successful than an indifferent mixed investment approach. 
(The terminology, “primarily” financial or “primarily” strategic as opposed to 
“strictly” is used to point out that CVCs – unlike VCs – always need to have their 
natural “second” objective – strategic or financial respectively – in mind).  
Proposition 1a: The clearer the focus of the CVCs is, the more financially and 
strategically successful the CVC program is likely to be. 
 
Additionally, one observes the following: (i) the success rates of classical, 
experienced VCs, which only focus on financial goals, tend to be higher than 
those of CVCs, (ii) in the long run any investment can only be considered a 
strategic success if it is also financially tenable or successful; (iii) any unit within a 
corporate has to financially contribute to the profit of an organization to justify its 
existence in the long run. At the same time, CVC units are – one way or the other 
– bound by their corporate parent and hence have to take its interests and 
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strategic orientation into consideration. Therefore, we conclude that the primarily 
financial approach is overall – both financially and strategically – even more 
successful and promising than the primarily strategic approach. 
 
Following Chandler’s (1962) famous theory that structure follows strategy, the 
financial as well as the strategic goals have to be reflected in appropriate 
underlying organizational structures and processes of the CVC, which can then 
subsequently support the CVC’s goals.   
Proposition 1b: The more consistent the underlying organizational structures and 
processes with the stated goals, the more efficiently these goals 
can be pursued and reached.  
 
Siegel et al. (1988) as well as Birkinshaw et al. (2002) found that organizationally 
independent CVCs were financially more successful than dependent ones.  
Birkinshaw et al. (2002) explained that “young” venture units need to “create 
distance between themselves and their parent companies, through a separate 
fund, a high level of decision-making autonomy, strong links to the VC community, 
and incentives based on carried interest and bonuses” (p. 4).  Mackewicz & 
Partner (2003) also report that experts considered organizational independence to 
be most important for the success of CVCs, but their study neither tests nor 
proves this claim.  It is possible to examine the claim’s validity on the basis of our 
data by focusing on two characteristics used by Siegel at al. (1988) and Birkin-
shaw et al. (2002) to represent organizational (in)dependence: decision-making 
autonomy of the CVC unit and fund structure.  
Proposition 2a: The greater a CVC’s decision-making autonomy, the more 
successful the CVC unit will be. 
Proposition 2b: The greater the parent company’s financial commitment to its 
CVC unit the more successful the CVC unit is likely to be. 
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Figure 2: Potential of the four CVC investment categories 
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Summarising in a simple way which kind of CVCs are considered to have the 
highest potential and hence, are most likely to be successful in the long term, 
Figure 2 has been developed. It demonstrates that such CVCs, which have rather 
independent organisational structures and follow a mainly financial approach, are 
expected to have the highest potential for the reasons mentioned above.  The 
least successful ones are expected to be those CVCs, which aim for financial 
goals while remaining dependent on their corporate mother. This is because these 
two goals are considered to be contradictory and hence, not achievable at the 
same time. 
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Methods 
Sample and Design 
The propositions are examined by using data from two waves of a comprehensive 
study we have conducted in Germany.  In the first wave a standardized question-
naire was sent to all the CVCs operating in Germany in 2001 that had existed long 
enough to be able to report on their strategic and financial goal attainment.  The 
sample of 34 CVCs included only those that had been founded in 2000 or earlier 
(the average founding year was 1997).  Twenty of the companies responded, 
which represents a high return rate of 62.5% for a mailed questionnaire survey.  
The second wave of the study was a standardized follow-up telephone interview 
conducted in February 2002 with the CVCs that had participated in the first wave.  
One of the CVCs in the sample had left the market by the time the follow-up 
telephone interviews were conducted, so the data for the second wave is based 
on the remaining 19 organizations.  Such a standardized approach essentially 
eliminates the interview bias and increases the quality of the data.   
 
The validity and reliability of the data were verified in a number of ways.  First, the 
five-page questionnaire was pre-tested with several investment managers in the 
first wave, and the same pre-testing was conducted in the second wave for the 
telephone interviews.  The data from the two survey waves were combined.  
Because of the small number of cases, a highly quantitative statistical analysis of 
the dataset was inappropriate. Instead, other national and international studies 
were drawn upon and incorporated into the mainly descriptive statistical analysis. 
This comparative data put our results in perspective. 
 
In order to be able to compare CVCs with the traditional independent VCs in 
Germany, the same questionnaire was also sent in 2001 to all the German VCs 
that focused on early stage financing. Out of the 216 such companies in Germany 
at the time, 68 returned a complete questionnaire (response rate of 31.5%). Some 
key characteristics of this sample were compared with the Statistics of the 
German Private Equity Association (BVK), which contain almost all German VCs.  
This was done to understand how this sample differs or represents the overall 
German market. It turned out that the 68 VCs of our sample have larger funds, 
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bigger portfolios and higher sums invested than the BVK average. This suggests 
that the respondents represent the bigger and probably more important VCs in the 
market, which was de facto the case.2  The average founding year was 1995, 
hence, on average two years older than the CVCs 
 
Measures 
The following measures build on those we found in previous comparable 
research, including some we adopted from Siegel et al. (1988) and Schween 
(1996). Where necessary new measures were added to cover items not yet 
appropriately dealt with in the literature.   
1. Significance of financial versus strategic goals: used as a measure of profit 
versus strategic orientation and ambitions of CVCs.  We measured the 
significance of these two types of goals on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 
(exclusively financial goals) to 5 (exclusively strategic goals), adopted from 
Schween (1996). 
2. Value of investment criteria: used as a measure of profit versus 
strategically driven investment decisions of CVCs. The answers indicate 
which aspects are important when deciding to invest in potential portfolio 
companies. At the same time, they are used to control the previous 
question. A total of 29 criteria, scored on a 6-point scale ranging from 1 (no 
importance) to 6 (very important).  Some of them are adopted from 
MacMillan et al. (1985), others from Schween (1996). The eight additional 
criteria focused specifically on corporate venture capitalists are mostly self-
constructed and therefore have not been tested before. 
3. Decision-making autonomy: used as an indicator for independency of the 
corporate venture capital unit. Independence is interpreted as delivering 
fact-based decisions based on objective criteria rather than on internal 
politics. We measured it with four categories adopted from Schween (1996) 
as well as self developed ones. Important decisions such as those 
                                            
2  For a detailed comparison of this sample with the BVK statistic, see Weber and 
 
  
 
17 
concerning investments are made (a) within the CVC unit and without the 
parent company, (b) in close consultation and in concert with the parent 
company, (c) within a committee in the parent company as proposed by the 
CVC unit, or (d) in accordance first with (a), thereafter (c), depending on 
the sum to be invested. 
4. Financial commitment by the parent company: used as an indicator for 
long-term commitment to the asset class. Long-term commitment, which 
cannot easily be recalled from the headquarter (in an own fund), in turn 
provides independence for the venture capital unit. This is important in 
order to establish the unit as an independent, respected player in the 
market. We measured the financial commitment in two categories: (a) a 
clearly defined fund or freely accessible financial means providing for a 
relatively long period; (b) no clearly defined fund or no financial means 
providing for a relatively long period; instead, ad hoc decisions recorded as 
an outflow on the balance sheet. 
5. Strategic success or attainment of strategic goals: used as a measure of 
strategic performance/success. Strategic success is very individual and 
hence rather difficult to measure with objective criteria (Mackewicz & 
Partner 2003). The measurement is based on Schween’s 5-point scale of 
satisfaction (1996). This 5-point scale ranges from 1 (not at all attained) to 
5 (completely attained).  This scale was enlarged by a sixth category “too 
early to tell” due to the youth of the CVC units and lack of exits in the 
portfolio.  Two arithmetic means were calculated as an additional measure 
of this variable to make them comparable to two other datasets (Schween 
1996 and Siegel et al. 1988).  
6. Financial success or attainment of financial goals: used as a measure of 
financial performance/success.  It is measured quantitatively to make it as 
objective and comparable as possible.  The CVC’s internal rate of return 
(IRR) was examined with a 5-point scale ranging from an IRR smaller than 
0% to an IRR of above 30%.  This scale was enlarged by a sixth category 
                                            
Dierkes (2002). 
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“too early to tell” due to the youth of the CVC units and lack of exits in the 
portfolio.  Unfortunately, exactly comparable data for the German VCs or 
the US CVCs do not exist.  An arithmetic mean was calculated to 
approximately compare the findings to those of Schween (1996) as well as 
Siegel et al. (1988).  
 
Methodology 
The 20 CVCs analyzed in the first wave of the study included all major players in 
the German market.  We compared our dataset with the data of a recent survey of 
Mackewicz & Partner (2003) who surveyed 31 German CVCs, which constitutes 
almost all German CVCs.  The comparison demonstrates that our dataset 
sufficiently represents the German CVC market.  With 80 million Euro per CVC, 
the average fund invested by CVCs in our dataset is similar to the data from 
Mackewicz & Partner (2003) with 77 million Euro.3  Mackewicz & Partner (2003) 
report an average of 24 portfolio companies per CVC while our dataset states 19 
portfolio companies per CVC.  These figures are skewed by the very large 
number of investments made by a few companies. The median score, which is 
perhaps a better indication of the norm, suggests that our typical CVC has 
invested 13 million Euro and has 9 companies in its portfolio.  This is due to the 
fact that the German CVC market includes several CVCs that have only up to 
three companies in the portfolio.  Unfortunately, no comparative data on medias 
was available. 
 
Limitations of our study arise from two facts.   First, the CVC market in Germany 
is still comparatively young.  Second, the slump that hit the so-called “Neuer 
Markt” (German stock exchange for young technology companies) in 2001 has 
considerably reduced the existing perspectives of VCs.  These two circumstances 
meant that some of the interviewees could not yet answer questions about their 
strategic and their financial success.  These participants in the study had not been 
                                            
3  Reliable information on fund volume in both cases was difficult to attain as most CVCs 
do not operate out of a clearly determined funds. 
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in the market long enough and/or market conditions had not allowed them to exit 
any investments.   
Results 
The results of the two waves of data collection on German CVCs, as well as the 
new data generated in this study about German VCs, are presented here in such 
a way as to allow them to be compared with the findings of other studies about 
German and American CVCs.  The first part of the comparison relates to 
investment facts (volume, stage, industry, geography) to get an understanding of 
the German venture market as such. It compares our German CVC data with our 
German VC data.  The second part turns to organizational, structural and strategic 
aspects of the CVC market to help answer our questions regarding the CVCs’ 
goals, structures and performance. The new German results are again compared 
with the findings of one international as well as other German, and American 
studies, where possible.  
 
Investment Facts 
Fund volume 
Only 25% of the surveyed CVCs invest out of a clearly defined, limited fund.  For 
the classical VCs, this is twice as high with 52%.  Having said that, it is rather 
difficult to provide exact amounts regarding the CVCs’ fund volume since there is 
no defined fund in most cases.  Those 5 CVCs that do have a defined fund size, 
state on average a fund volume of 143 million Euro.  Due to the small sample, this 
number is not representative.  The average fund volume of classical VCs is twice 
as high with 255 million Euro. 
 
Number of portfolio companies 
 
The surveyed CVCs have an average of 19 companies in their portfolio and a 
median score of 9 companies. This is more or less comparable to the classical 
VCs, which have 22 portfolio companies on average and a median of 10.5.  
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Investment focus – by sector 
The results indicate that 50% of all CVC investments are undertaken in three 
investment sectors (see Table 1).  The IT-Software sector ranges first, with 23% 
of the investments followed by communication technology, with 17% invested 
capital. Third comes biotechnology/chemistry with 10%. Compared to the VCs, 
similarities and differences become apparent (see Table 1).  CVCs are about 
three times more engaged in Multimedia/Internet than VCs.  They are significantly 
less invested in sectors like medical equipment/ diagnostics as well as 
engineering/materials. 
 
Table 1: Investment by sector – comparison by VC-types 
  
 
Corporate VCs 
in % (n = 20) 
Classical VCs 
in %(n = 52) 
1. Sector   
 IT-Hardware 5 7 
 Communication technology 17 18 
 IT-Hardware 5 7 
 IT-Software 23 24 
 Medical Equipment/Diagnostics 1 7 
 Biotechnology/Chemistry 10 13 
 Engineering/Materials 1 7 
 Consumer goods 0 2 
 Trade/E-Commerce 6 5 
 Financial Services/Other Services 4 3 
 Multimedia/Internet 14 4 
 Energy/Environment 2 1 
 Other Sectors  2 2 
2. Company Stages   
 Seed-Stage 35 25 
 Start-up-Stage 30 38 
 Expansion/Early Stage 28 30 
 Other stages  0 6 
 n.a.   7 1 
3. Regions   
 Germany 69 76 
 Other Europe 9 12 
 Outside Europe 21 11 
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Investments focus – by company stage 
Our study included only VCs that focus on early stage investments.  These VCs 
invest about 90% of their current fund in one of the first three investment stages: 
seed, start-up, early and expansion stage (see Table 1).  Only 6% of the VCs 
indicate to also invest in other stages like second round, later stage or bridge 
financing; CVCs even state 0%. 
 
CVCs put priority on seed investments with an average of 35% invested capital.  
Classical VCs invest only 25% in seed stages.  For them, start-up investments 
seem to be most important with 38% of their capital allocated there (only 30% for 
CVCs).  Both put similar emphasis on expansion/early stage (CVCs: 28%, 
classical VCs 30%). 
 
Investments focus – by region 
Both VC groups have a clear national focus. CVCs invested 69% and classical 
VCs 76% of their capital in Germany (see Table 1).  The remainder was invested 
within Europe 9% (12% respectively) and outside Europe 21% (11% respectively).  
 
Organizational, structural and strategic aspects 
The second part of this study inquires into organizational, structural and strategic 
aspects of the German CVC market. Information on selected characteristics was 
gathered: strategic goals, investment criteria, fund structure, decision-making 
autonomy, and attainment of strategic and financial goals (performance). 
 
Strategic and financial goals 
 
Of the 19 CVCs surveyed, 42% stated that they primarily pursued strategic goals; 
21%, primarily financial goals.  Strategic and financial goals were pursued equally 
by 37% of the CVCs (see Table 2).   
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Table 2: Goals of Corporate Venture Capital organizations 
Goals Schween (1996) 
(in %) 
Weber / Weber 
(2002) in (%) 
Mackewicz & Partner
(2003) in (%) 
Exclusively strategic 25 - 15 
Primarily strategic 58 42 33 
Strategic and financial 17 37 21 
Primarily financial 0 21 27 
Exclusively financial 0 0 3 
Total 100 100 99 
 
 
The findings of our new German study differ quite markedly from those of 
Schween (1996), who found that 10 of the 12 companies (83%) stressed strategic 
goals, with two companies (17%) stating that they pursued strategic and financial 
goals simultaneously.  Mackewicz & Partner (2003) reported that 48% pursued 
strategic goals “primarily or exclusively”, and 30% focused on financial goals 
“primarily or exclusively”.  Unfortunately, neither Siegel et al. (1988) nor Birkin-
shaw et al. (2002) posed the question this way.  Therefore, the new German data 
can be compared directly only to other German CVC studies.  
 
Nevertheless, indirect comparisons with the international data are possible.  
Siegel et al. (1988) asked a somewhat similar question, which lets them conclude 
that the objective considered most important by CVCs is return on investment 
(mean 3.38).4  Of the objectives related to strategic benefits, the most important 
was exposure to new technologies and markets (mean 3.12).  Birkinshaw et al. 
(2002) explored seven distinct reasons for establishing a venture unit. On a scale 
from 1 to 5, the most important reason was “to learn from and develop strategic 
relationships with portfolio companies” (3.6), and second most important was “to 
increase demand for our products and services” (2.7). Both are clearly strategic 
                                            
4  However, Siegel et a. (1988) note: “the high standard deviation for this objective indi-
cates that there is not high consensus as to the importance of this objective. In fact, 
nearly 42% of the respondents listed return on investment as less than essential” (p. 
235). 
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goals. The reason to invest in external start-ups for financial returns rated lower 
(2.3)5. 
 
Investment criteria 
The CVCs in our survey ranked “product’s uniqueness and degree of innovation” 
as the most important investment criterion (mean: 5.4 on a scale from 1 to 6).  
The German VCs we studied ranked this criterion equally high but at the same 
level with “expected return” and “industry experience”.  “Management’s ability to 
attract highly qualified employees” was ranked second (5.3) by the CVCs. The 
“expected return” was ranked a close third along with “industry experience” and 
the management team’s “quality of leadership” (5.2) (see Table 3).   
 
In contrast, the ranking of the U.S. study from 1988 by Siegel et al. differs 
substantially from ours.  This might partially be due to different criteria being 
questioned, which makes a comparison of the results difficult.  It is interesting to 
note that in Siegel et al. (1988), a management related criterion “entrepreneur’s 
capability of sustained effort” ranked first while it is a product related one for 
Weber and Dierkes (2002).  Siegel et al. (1988) rank “industry experience“ second 
and “ability to evaluate and react well to risk” third.  Financial criteria ranked ninth.  
Schween’s study (1996) also showed that the CVCs put less emphasis on 
financial criteria, ranking them only in seventh place. Most important at that time 
were “potential size and growth of the market” (4.6) along with “ability to evaluate 
and react well to risk” (4.6). 
                                            
5  The low rating of this answer could be surprising. We believe it is due to the fact that 
Birkinshaw et al. (2002) formulated their question in such a narrow way: „investment in 
independent start-ups / external business ideas purely (italic emphasis by the authors) 
as financial investments“ (p. 15), and hence, consider it comprehensible.  
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Table 3: Investment criteria of CVCs and independent VCs 
Investment criteria 
(by average level of significance) 
Weber/ 
Weber (2002) a) 
—————— 
CVCs 
(n = 20) 
Weber/ 
Weber (2002) a) 
————– 
VCs 
(n = 52) 
Schween 
(1996) b) 
————– 
VCs 
(n = 12) 
Siegel et 
al. (1988) 
c) 
————– 
CVCs 
(n = 52) 
Product’s uniqueness or innovativeness   1 (5.4) 1 (5.4) 3 (4.0) 7 
Management’s ability to attract and retain 
highly qualified employees   2 (5.3) 3 (5.0) - 13 
Expected return at point of exit; 10-fold 
increase in investment in 5 to 10 
years 
  3 (5.2) 1 (5.4) 7 (2.6) 9 
Industry experience; management team’s 
knowledge of the market   3 (5.2) 1 (5.4) 2 (4.2) 2 
Quality of management team’s leadership   3 (5.2) 2 (5.1) 3 (4.0) 6 
Completeness of the management team   4 (5.1) 6 (4.7) - - 
Potential, size, and growth of the market   5 (5.0) 5 (4.8) 1 (4.6) 5 
Ability to evaluate and react well to risk   -  1 (4.6) 3 
Management team with whom the 
“chemistry is right”/Personality 
compatible with mine 
  6 (4.9) 3 (5.0) - 22 
Management’s ability to communicate   6 (4.9) 4 (4.9) 4 (3.8) 8 
Demonstrable acceptance of the product 
in the market   6 (4.9) 5 (4.8) 2 (4.2) 19 
Management team’s complementarities   6 (4.9) 5 (4.8) 3 (4.0) - 
Entrepreneur’s capability of sustained 
effort - - 3 (4.0) 1 
Ability to take criticism - - 3 (4.0) 15 
Thoroughly familiar with the product - - 4 (3.8) 4 
Ability to build, convey, or retain an 
image of the corporation as an 
innovator d) 
  7 (4.5) - - - 
Reputation of the portfolio company’s 
partners or customers    8 (4.4) 10 (4.0) - - 
Management’s experience with new 
ventures   9 (4.3) 10 (4.0) - - 
Track record relevant to the venture - - - 10 
Potential strategic business partners or 
alliances for the corporate mother d)   9 (4.3) - 2 (4.2) - 
Expected time until product is ready for 
the market; prototype exists   10 (4.2) 7 (4.5) 7 (2.4) 14 
Patent protection of the products   11 (4.0) 8 (4.4) 5 (3.6) - 
Potential pool of ideas for the parent 
company d)   11 (4,0) - - - 
Current valuation 12 (3.9) 8 (4.4) - - 
Important market for the parent company d)   -  4 (3.8) 11 
Same market as that of the parent 
company d)   -  6 (3.0)  
No expectation of relevant competition in 
first 3 years   17 (2.9) 13 (3.2) 5 (3.6) 18 
Note: The numbers in this table indicate the ranking of the criteria.   
a) Average values on a scale ranging from 1 (unimportant) to 6 (very important). 
b) Average values on a scale ranging from 1 (unimportant to 5 (very important) 
c) Average values on a scale ranging from 1 (irrelevant) to 4 (essential). 
d) Refers only to CVCs. 
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Fund structure 
Fully 63% of the CVCs surveyed had their own fund or freely accessible financial 
means providing for a relatively long period; 37% stated that they did not invest 
from a defined fund.  
 
Siegel et al. (1988) divided their answers into three categories.  48% of the CVCs 
in their study explained that a separate pool of funds is specifically earmarked for 
venture capital investment on a onetime basis, another 27% invested out of a 
separate pool of funds, which is specifically earmarked for VC investments on a 
periodic basis. Of the CVCs surveyed 19% fund their deals on an ad hoc basis. 
The first two categories correspond more or less to our first category and are 
hence partially comparable. If one considers this to be a valid comparison, there is 
a higher percentage (75%) of CVCs with a relatively independent money source in 
the US than in Germany.  
 
In the international study by Birkinshaw et al. (2002), 58% CVC units have either a 
closed fund established solely by the parent company or a separate pot of money 
set aside for corporate venturing.  In 35% of the cases, the money is provided on 
the basis of internal review – meaning that investments have to pass a review 
committee (Birkinshaw et al. 2002, p. 14). These figures are relatively similar to 
ours.  
 
Decision-making autonomy 
In only 16% of the organizations in our German sample were investment 
decisions made within the CVC unit independently of the parent company, or 
independently but only up to a certain deal size; 16% decided jointly in close 
consultation with the parent company.  The remaining 68% of the surveyed CVCs 
made suggestions to the parent company, which then took the decisions alone.  
 
Again, the precise formulations of the questions differed between the studies, but 
nevertheless a comparison seems to be meaningful.  Similar to the German 
results, Siegel et al.’s study (1988) found that the majority of the CVCs surveyed 
were given little autonomy to select which ventures should be funded.  Fewer of 
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the American venture professionals (51%) than Germans (68%) indicated that 
formal approval from corporate management was required for all deals.  Fifteen 
percent of the CVCs in the U.S. sample required approval for deals over a 
designated size.  Only 11% did not need any approval from the corporate parent 
but could decide entirely independently. In Germany, only one of the CVCs is 
given such independence.  
 
Birkinshaw et al. (2002) also found that large investment decisions had a strong 
parent-company influence.  Even on small investments “the norm is for the 
corporate venture unit’s decisions to be ratified by or made in consultation with the 
parent company” (p. 16). This suggests that in the countries they investigated the 
situation of decision-making autonomy is similar to Germany.  
 
Attainment of strategic goals 
Responses related to performance must be reviewed with care, given the self-
report nature of this study and the subjectivity involved in rating one’s own 
performance.  A total of 58% of the German CVCs stated that they had 
“completely” or “largely” attained their strategic goals; 37% reported that their 
goals had been only “partially” or “largely unattained”.  None responded that 
strategic goals were “not at all attained”.  A total of 5% of the CVCs explained that 
their CVC unit was not yet long enough in business in order to draw such 
conclusions (see Table 4).   
 
Table 4: Attainment of strategic goals 
Reported level of attainment 
Companies in the sample 
(%) 
Completely attained 21 
Largely attained 37 
Partially attained  32 
Largely unattained  5 
Not at all attained 0 
Still too early to tell 5 
Total 100 
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Converting these values into an arithmetic mean (scored on a scale from 1 [not at 
all attained] to 5 [completely attained])6 to make them comparable to the data of 
Schween (1996) one arrives at an arithmetic mean of 2.78.  Schween (1996) 
found an arithmetic mean of 2.0 for “overall satisfaction with the attainment of 
strategic goals” (p. 189).  
 
For 21% of the German CVCs, attainment of strategic goals consisted in their 
CVC activities having helped them develop new strategic fields of business.  The 
remaining 79% of the CVCs did not report such success.  According to 84% of the 
surveyed CVCs, their activities had strengthened existing areas of the parent 
company’s business, especially via know-how-transfer (88%) as well as via 
partnerships and/or cooperative arrangements between business units of the 
corporate parent and the venture (56%) (Weber and Weber 2002). 
 
It is difficult to compare the new German findings with those published by Siegel 
et al. (1988) for three reasons: (i) they surveyed different goals (called objectives) 
which can be categorized into strategic and financial goals; (ii) they did not 
examine the degree of goal attainment, but rather the general level of satisfaction 
relative to the CVCs’ objectives, which is even more subjective; and (iii) they used 
a different scale, which is not comparable with the one calculated above, because 
it ranges from 1 [unsatisfactory] to 4 [outstanding].  We therefore calculated a 
second mean from our dataset, which happened to be the same mean of 2.78, to 
obtain an approximate value, making it somewhat comparable to Siegel et al. as 
well.  The objective with which the U.S. CVCs were most satisfied was “exposure 
to new technologies and markets” with a mean of 2.8, followed by “return on 
investment” (mean of 2.47). Also the objectives “opportunities to manufacture and 
market new products” and “acquisition candidates” were more than satisfactory 
(mean of 2.41 and 2.30). The only objective that was assessed to be less than 
satisfactory was “opportunity to improve manufacturing processes” (mean of 
1.75).  A comparison of these results with our data suggests that the level of 
                                            
6  The category “still too early to tell” was not included in the arithmetic mean. 
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attainment/satisfaction in the U.S. companies tends to be slightly lower than our 
German second mean of 2.78. 
 
Attainment of financial goals  
Just under half (47%) of the CVCs in the study claimed to have an IRR above 
zero and hence at least somewhat attained their financial goals, 21% were not 
successful (see Table 5).  Again, due to the youth of the German CVC market, 
about one third (32%) reported that it was still too early for them to tell and that no 
exits had occurred yet.  Converting these values into an arithmetic mean 
comparable to Schween (1996) and Siegel et al. (1988) (scored on a scale from 1 
[not at all attained] to 5 [completely attained])7, one arrives at 2.45.  This result is 
almost exactly the same as the mean financial goal attainment of 2.47 reported by 
Siegel et al. (1988).  The arithmetic mean reported by Schween (1996) was 1.9, 
which is significantly lower. 
 
 
Table 5: Attainment of financial goals 
IRR a)  
(in percentages) 
Companies in 
the sample 
(%) 
> 30 Completely attained 0 
21–30 Largely attained  21 
11–20 Attained 10 
0–10 Largely not attained 16 
< 0 Not at all attained 21 
< 0 “Too early to tell” or “no exits 
yet” 32 
Total 100 
a) Internal rate of return, an expression of the level of attainment 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
7  The category “still too early to tell” was not included in the arithmetic mean. 
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Proposition Examination  
Having presented and compared the investment statistics as well as the results on 
organizational, structural and strategic aspects with other national and internatio-
nal datasets, we can now turn to examining our propositions.  
Proposition 1a: The clearer the focus of the CVC is, the more financially and 
strategically successful the CVC program is likely to be. 
 
Only 25% of the CVCs that pursued strategic goals “primarily or exclusively” 
reported that they had attained their financial goals.  Forty-three percent of the 
CVCs with a mixed approach pursuing financial and strategic goals equally. All the 
CVCs that had pursued primarily financial goals stated that they had attained their 
financial goals.  Of the CVCs with primarily or exclusively strategic goals, 63% 
largely or completely attained them.  Among the CVCs that pursued primarily 
financial goals, 75% attained their strategic goals.  Only 29% of the CVCs with a 
mixed approach reported that they had attained their strategic goals. These 
results support our proposition that those CVCs with a largely financial approach 
are by far the most successful. The mixed approach is financially more successful 
than the primarily or exclusively strategic approach.  Concerning the strategic goal 
attainment our proposition is supported. 
Proposition 1b: The more consistent the underlying organizational structures and 
processes with the stated goals, the more efficiently these goals 
can be pursued and reached. 
 
Five of the 19 CVCs surveyed pursued primarily financial goals, six gave equal 
weight to financial and strategic goals, eight stressed primarily strategic ones (see 
Table 6). Of those five pursuing financial goals, only two indicated that they had 
access to a clearly defined fund or freely accessible financial means providing for 
a relatively long period.  Only one of these five took investment decisions by itself 
without the corporate mother, but only up to a certain amount.  Of the six CVCs 
that pursued financial and strategic goals equally, five indicated that they have an 
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independent fund of their own, one took investment decisions entirely 
independently, and one up to a certain amount.  Of those eight CVCs that 
primarily pursue strategic goals, three quarters had access to an independent 
fund, but none of them was able to make investment decisions without the 
corporate parent.  These results do not allow a clear conclusion to be drawn about 
our proposition. 
 
Table 6: Goals, organizational structures/process, and goal attainment 
 GOALS STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES        PERFORMANCE 
  Own fund? Who decides? IRR 
Attainment of  
strategic goals? 
1 financial no gremium in corp. mother 21-30% completely 
2 financial yes gremium in corp. mother 21-30% largely 
3 financial yes 
CVC unit – up to a certain 
amount 11-20% largely 
4 financial no gremium in corp. mother 11-20% partially 
5 financial no in agreement with corp. mother 0-10% partially 
6 strat=fin no gremium in corp. mother 21-30% completely 
7 strat=fin yes VC without corp. mother 0-10% largely 
8 strat=fin yes gremium in corp. mother <0% partially 
9 strat=fin yes gremium in corp. mother no exits partially 
10 strat=fin yes 
CVC unit – up to a certain 
amount  no exits 
too young/tendency 
positive 
11 strat=fin yes gremium in corp. mother no exits 
too young/tendency 
positive 
12 strategic yes gremium in corp. mother 21-30% partially 
13 strategic yes gremium in corp. mother <0% largely 
14 strategic no gremium in corp. mother 0-10% partially 
15 strategic yes in agreement with corp. mother <0% completely 
16 strategic yes gremium in corp. mother <0% largely NOT 
17 strategic yes in agreement with corp. mother no exits largely 
18 strategic yes gremium in corp. mother no exits largely 
19 strategic no gremium in corp. mother no exits largely 
  
 
31 
Proposition 2a: The greater a CVC’s decision-making autonomy, the more 
successful the CVC unit will be. 
 
Of the three CVCs that made their investment decisions – at least up to a certain 
deal size – independently of the parent company, two stated that they were 
financially successful and that they had largely or completely attained their 
strategic goals (see Table 6).  Among the CVCs that did not make their 
investment decisions on their own and instead submitted proposals to the parent 
company, only 44% reported that they were financially successful and 50% were 
strategically successful.  These findings seem to support our proposition. 
Proposition 2b: The greater the parent company’s financial commitment to its 
CVC unit the more successful the CVC unit will be. 
 
Of the CVCs that had their own funds or freely accessible money, 62% responded 
that they had largely or completely attained their strategic goals.  The CVCs that 
had no fund or freely accessible money of their own reported nearly as frequently 
that they had attained their strategic goals (50%) (see Table 6).  As for the 
attainment of financial goals, this second group did much better than the first, with 
83% stating that they were financially successful as opposed to 31% of the CVCs 
that had a fund of their own.  Surprisingly, these observations do not support our 
proposition but suggest the opposite to be true.  
Discussion 
The new German survey of CVCs gathered comprehensive data on goals, invest-
ment criteria, decision-making autonomy, fund structure, and goal attainment for 
the first time in six years.  This update was urgently needed because the CVC 
market in the period under study has nearly tripled in size, though the number of 
such organizations is still miniscule compared to that in the United States 
(approximately 300).  The comparison of our CVC results to our own German VC 
data (see also Weber and Dierkes 2002), to other German CVC studies like 
Schween (1996) and Mackewicz & Partner (2003), to the information reported by 
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Siegel et al. (1988) for the U.S. CVC market, as well as to international data from 
Birkinshaw et al. (2002) provides a better understanding of the German CVC 
market.  This comparison covers the first aspect of this paper as lined out in the 
introduction. 
 
The question is: How successful are the CVCs and what are potential factors in-
fluencing their success?  By analyzing the CVCs’ strategic and financial goals as 
well as their goal attainment in more detail, we aim to contribute to the 
development of a theory as to which overall strategy and which underlying 
structural approach might be the most promising.  
 
A comparison of our data with those generated in Germany several years earlier 
by Schween (1996) allowed us to understand whether the German CVCs have 
changed the priorities of their goals and investment criteria over time and, above 
all, whether they are operating more successfully today than they were six years 
ago8. In order to examine the CVCs’ successes and their influencing factors, we 
compare our German data with the international study by Mackewicz & Partner 
(2003) to see where significant similarities or differences emerge between the 
CVCs in Germany and abroad.  
 
1. Strategic and financial goals  
Since 1996, the priority has clearly shifted from strategic to financial goals.  
In 1996, 83% of the surveyed CVCs still stated that they were pursuing 
exclusively or primarily strategic goals, whereas today that figure stands at 
42% in our dataset and at 48% in Mackewicz and Partner’s (2003) dataset 
(see Table 2).  The remaining 17% of the CVCs in the 1996 survey stated 
that they pursuit a mixed approach of strategic and financial goals.  In our 
dataset this figure stands at 37% and at 21% in Mackewicz and Partner’s 
(2003) dataset.  It seems especially noteworthy that 21% of the surveyed 
CVCs in our study and even 27% of the CVCs in Mackewicz’ study stated 
                                            
8  This comparison is not based on a panel.  It is a comparison between aggregate data 
based on different samples. 
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that they were pursuing primarily financial goals (+ 3% of those CVCs who 
exclusively pursue financial goals).  There were no such responses in 
1996.  These results suggest that the investment priorities of CVCs are 
converging with those of the classical independent German VCs (Weber 
and Dierkes 2002).  If one assumes that the financial contribution of a CVC 
unit within a corporation is essential to justify its existence and to make it 
sustainable, a shift towards financial rather than strategic orientation seems 
to be advisable. 
 
2. Investment criteria 
A look at the most important investment criteria highlights the shift to 
emphasizing financial goals over strategic ones.  Financial criteria were still 
more or less neglected in 1988 (US) and 1996 (Germany), whereas they 
have become one of the three most important criteria today (see Table 3) – 
about on par with the priority they receive among the classical independent 
VCs in Germany (Weber and Dierkes 2002). This means the CVCs in 
Germany have undergone a change process in the last six years regarding 
both their goals (see above) as well as their investment criteria. 
 
3. Attainment of strategic goals 
Attainment of strategic goals has definitely improved over the past six 
years.  Whereas 17% of the surveyed CVCs in 1996 stated that they had 
largely or completely attained their strategic goals, this figure stands at 
58% in 2002.  The arithmetic mean for the attainment of strategic goals has 
risen within the past six years from 2.0 (Schween 1996) to 2.78 in our 
study.  It might be explained by the shift in goals and investment criteria 
from a more strategic orientation towards a primarily financial approach. 
This in turn could be interpreted as a learning process.  Learning as an 
explanation of these observations sounds plausible since in 1996, the 
German CVC market was still in its infancy and one would expect some 
kind of learning curve. This seems particularly likely given the high 
percentage of investment managers in the CVC units who came out of the 
corporation with little or no VC investment experience (Weber and Dierkes 
2002). The high percentage of CVCs pursuing a mixed strategy (37%) 
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might be explained as being not yet that far advanced, in other words: they 
are on their way on the learning curve from a strategic to a financial 
approach. It could alternatively simply be due to our small dataset. 
 
4. Attainment of financial goals 
The CVCs have also greatly improved in the attainment of their financial 
goals in the past years.  In 1996 only 17% of the surveyed CVCs stated 
that they had attained their financial goals, whereas in 2002 just under half 
(47%) claimed to have done so (see Table 5).  The arithmetic mean 
reported by Schween (1996) was 1.9; today’s mean is 2.45.  It is striking 
that only 25% of the strategy-oriented CVCs have achieved their financial 
goals, whereas 100% of the financially oriented CVCs do so.  The 
increased attainment of financial goals can partially be attributed to the 
changes in the CVCs’ goal structure towards financial goals.  This 
development can equally be interpreted as part of a learning process.  The 
CVCs are likely to have learned from the more established and 
experienced independent VCs and to have been able to transfer their 
knowledge and adopt their learning to the specific needs of the respective 
corporate environment. 
 
We can thus answer the second question raised in the introduction by saying that 
CVCs emphasizing primarily financial or primarily strategic goals seem to be more 
successful than those following a mixed approach. Maybe this result indicates that 
it is extremely difficult to sensibly structure and manage a program with two, 
sometimes conflicting, goals.  Intuitively, it makes sense that a financially driven 
CVC that follows market incentives cannot at the same time fully pursue the 
strategic preferences of the corporate.  A portfolio company that does not 
generate a return on investment in the medium term but represents a high 
strategic value in the long run would be an example of such a goal conflict.  
 
The results further indicate that the primarily financial approach seems to be 
financially and strategically more successful than the primarily strategic approach 
(see Table 6).  Our results therefore confirm the conclusions drawn by Siegel et 
al. (1988) that an approach that primarily takes financial goals into consideration, 
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tends to be the most successful, both strategically and financially.  The 
observations by Gompers and Lerner (1998) are partially challenged, at least for 
the German CVCs.  
 
Despite these findings, the unclear results regarding the consistency argument 
seem to indicate that “the one best strategy” does not exist.  Instead, holistic 
solutions are required which are consistent with the individual circumstances of 
the CVC.  In other words, even though the financial approach generally seems to 
be more successful, there might be CVCs with internal or external conditions for 
which other approaches fit better.  The success of the venture therefore depends 
very much on how it is structured and organized. A CVC program with primarily 
financial goals has to be set up and run differently than one with primarily strategic 
goals.  
 
Hence, the answer to the third and fourth research question as to whether and 
how the organizational structures and processes might additionally influence the 
success of the CVC and whether these underlying organizational structures and 
processes should be consistent with the main investment goals remains less 
obvious and therefore more difficult to answer. 
 
5. Organizational structures/processes  
a) Structures/processes and success 
Birkinshaw et al. (2002), Witt and Brachtendorf (2002), and Mackewicz & 
Partner (2003) found that a CVC’s organizational independence is 
particularly important for financial and strategic success.  We explored this 
relationship with our data ex post as our survey was already completed 
when their surveys went out and their results were published. The empirical 
evidence that more independent CVCs are more successful is partially 
supported by our German data.  However, the sample is not only small but 
in this dimension also very unbalanced.  The 16 CVCs (84%) with relatively 
little decision-making autonomy are financially as well as strategically less 
successful compared to the 3 CVCs with more decision-making autonomy 
(see Table 6 and proposition 2a).  The 13 CVCs (68%) that reported having 
their own fund or freely accessible money are strategically comparably 
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successful but – contrary to our expectations – financially significantly less 
successful. Hence, only the finding that a high level of decision-making 
autonomy – as an indicator for independence – is a critical success factor 
for the corporate venture unit can be supported.  
German CVCs tend to be more dependent on their corporate mother than 
their U.S. counterparts are, even 14 years later (the time difference of the 
two studies).  This is reflected in fewer funds on their own (63% vs. 75% 
US) and in less investment decision-making autonomy.  The question 
arises as to why this is the case, given that the recommendations 
generated over the years by theoretical and empirical research point in the 
direction of giving greater autonomy in order to maximize success.  One 
might conclude that (i) the German situation is nevertheless a conscious 
practice as CVCs believe they will be more successful by pursuing this way 
(ii) the corporations might want to change the situation, but are still too 
deeply entrenched in the system and the underlying German culture of 
these structures. Another reason may be (iii) that the corporate structures 
and internal politics make it difficult to introduce a market oriented incentive 
scheme for venture units that would allow for an appropriate alignment of 
goals and structures.  It is not possible to provide a comprehensive and 
satisfactory answer at this stage.  Further empirical research on this point is 
necessary to validate this proposition for Germany on the basis of a larger 
dataset. 
 
b) Structures and processes and consistency with underlying goals 
The final aspect lies in determining the link between corporate investment 
goals, organizational structures and processes, and success.  This seems 
rather difficult.  The new German data and comparison with the other 
existing studies shows (i) that the CVCs that decide independently all have 
their own fund, and (ii) that in all the CVCs with primarily strategic goals 
decision making is done in close connection with the corporate parent.  
This seems to support our proposition 1b as both examples demonstrate 
consistency between goals and structures.  The goals are hence expected 
to be pursued more efficiently.  At the same time, however, 11 of the 14 
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CVCs that pursue an either primarily strategic or a mixed approach also 
report having their own fund.  This does not indicate consistent structures 
and seems therefore not in line with our proposition 1b, nor does it fit with 
Mackewicz & Partner’s findings (2003) that a strategic orientation requires 
a relatively close integration with the corporate parent9. 
Unfortunately on the basis of our data, we could not specify the most promising 
investment-organization-types. More research will be needed on larger samples to 
establish whether we (and Mackewicz & Partner) are correct in believing that a 
segmentation of CVCs in different investment-organization-types is needed, in 
which each segment forms a holistic entity between goals, structures and 
processes.  A larger sample would also allow to more accurately specify such a 
segmentation.  
 
This study makes three contributions to the literature on CVC and has several 
implications for future research.  This paper provides an extensive picture of CVC 
programs and the way they are managed up to date. It was the first empirically 
grounded analysis of CVCs since 1996, the point at which the CVC market in 
Germany began to gain any significance at all.  It is therefore able to describe the 
recent developments in the German CVC practice in depth and to provide a 
comparison of German practice with the one in the United States in terms of some 
key characteristics and developments.  
 
Second, by questioning the priority that CVCs have thus far placed on the pursuit 
of strategic goals, or a mix of both strategic and financial goals, this investigation 
suggests that (i) mixed strategies are not as successful as focused strategies on 
either financial or strategic aspects; (ii) an emphasis on primarily financial goals 
seems to be more successful than on primarily strategic goals.  
                                            
9  Birkinshaw et al. (2002) came to an observation that they called “counterintuitive”. 
They found a strong negative correlation between the extent to which the venture unit 
actively seeks out linkages with the business units in the parent company and 
performance. They conclude therefore: “if the venture unit is attempting to develop 
strategic options for its parent company, it should – all else being equal – not create 
strong linkages to its business units” (p. 33). 
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Third, Chandler’s (1962) theory that structure follows strategy seems to also hold 
for CVC programs.  Hence, the consistency of a CVC’s underlying structures and 
processes with the goals tends to be essential for a CVC’s ability to attain its 
goals and might be a promising path to pursue further.  While our results are 
unfortunately not clear on this point, it suggests that a more holistic approach is 
required when setting up, structuring and managing a CVC unit, keeping in mind 
the strategy and structure of the corporate organization.  Significantly, programs 
with financial objectives have to be managed differently from programs with 
strategic ones. Particularly the last point contributes to the development of a more 
refined theory of best practice for the set-up and integration of a CVC unit into its 
corporate parent. However, in order to eventually build a valid theory out of these 
and previous findings, the propositions outlined above need further specification 
and verification on the basis of a larger dataset.  
 
For future research, it would be intriguing to have the present work become a 
longitudinal study.  It would then be possible to follow the goals, structures, pro-
cesses, and success of the CVC market in general and of individual organizations 
in particular.  Such a longitudinal study should also continue to compare CVCs 
and classical VCs in order to gain further insight about which strategies work best 
and why.   
 
Research on the interface between the parent company and the CVC unit as a 
facilitator between the parent company and the portfolio company could provide 
further insight on additional success factors.  For instance, structuring all inter- 
and intra-organizational processes of the involved units – like communication, and 
compensation practices – strictly in line with the primary goals of the parties in-
volved could enhance the competitive advantage of the parent company through 
innovative ideas of portfolio companies.  It could increase the success of the port-
folio company by benefiting from the vast resources and knowledge of the parent.  
This would ultimately lead to the CVC’s success and support its acceptance in the 
organization.  
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